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1. Introduction
The 'Least Developed Countries' were in sorne respects the
success story of UNCTAD III, in that a number of measures were
approved which had the ostensible support of the rich countries
(partly, perhaps, as a diversion from their lack of support for in-
itiatives in most other areas). In this note I shall first consider
the question of 'identification' of the least-developed countries
and then examine the relevance and adequacy of some of the resolu-
tions passed at Santiago.
Much work has been done on the identification of the least-
developed countries, culminating in the list of 25 'hard-core'
least-developed countries produced in 1971 by the U.N. Committee for
Development Planning1. This broadly included countries with a GNP
per head of less than $100, a literacy rate of less than 20 per cent
and a contribution of manufacturing to GNP of less than 10 per cent.
It is clearly intended that this work should continue. Before look-
ing at what has been achieved, it is worth considering the whole no-
tion of identification. The implicit assumption of all this work
(and the word 'identification' makes this clear) is that there is
somewhere a group of countries which have sufficient in common for
us to make meaningful statements about them as a group. But classi-
fication is not an abstract process; it is carried Out to meet the
needs of particular people or groups, and is based on implicit as-
sumptions about the nature of the problem to be studied. In this
oartici'1r case, it is by no means clear what the assumptions and
purposes behind the classification are, and different groups clearly
have different assumptions and purposes in mind. It may be useful to
consider first, what it is that the classificatio.n is intended to
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show, and secondly what is the framework within which the classifi-
cation has to be carried out.
2. Defining the 'least-developed'.
First, what does the classification 'least-developed' mean?
It may be a welfare classification. The main welfare elements
in the identification procedures so far employed are GNP per head
and the percentage of literacy. It could be argued that people liv-
ing in countries defined in this way - taken as a whole and ignoring
problems of distribution - are 'worse off' than people living in
other countries. But if this is the meaning, welfare is clearly
being looked at in a very restricted way, and the virtual omission
of political, social or distributional criteria, or any measure of
the 'quality of life' (however defined) is very limiting. Moreover,
as I shall point Qut later, to define welfare in terms of countries
rather than of people gives oddly distorted results.
The classification has Rostovian overtones. It may be intended
to imply that there are stages of development and that these coun-
tries are at the first or most primitive one. Such an approach could
possibly be of analytical interest to students of the subject -
though it may also be of little practical or operational utility.
But an examination of the list lends little support to this inter-
pretation. Can a country such as Haiti which was a major sugar pro-
ducer and exporter 200 years ago and has been 'integrated' into the
world economy for 300 years usefully or in any meaningful sense be
regarded at this most primitive stage of development? It is however
true that some of the countries listed, such as Nepal, Yemen and
Ethiopia, can usefully be categorised in this way.
The classification may refer to structure. It may be supposed
that there is an economic or social structure which is found in the
'least-developed country' and which is not found in other countries.
Various elements of such a structure have been identified - a high
proportion of primary and correspondingly low proportion of second-
ary production in total output, low agricultural productivity and so
on. There seem to me to be several difficulties in this approach.
First these structural elements are found in many poor countries
whether or not they are classed as least-developed - Xhat is, any
sensible classification according to structure will probably cut
across the category of least-developed countries. Secondly, the mere
identification of these elements in structure tells us very little
about the dynamic elements in the situation. Thus in some poor coun-
tries (whether classed as least-developed or not) we can identify
factors making for stagnation or even retrogression; in others, it
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is possible to argue that, although now very poor and backward, they
have reasonable possibilities for advance if certain conditions are
fulfilled. Lastly, the apparent similarity in structure of the group
of 25 identified countries may be partly spurious, since the crite-
ria may be inter-dependent. Thus, although there may be exceptions
due to special circumstances, a country with a very low level of
average income will tend to have a low level of literacy, merely
because it cannot afford to spend much on education. Similarly,
countries with a very low average level of income will normally have
a low proportion of total value added deriving from industry, be-
cause output per head in industry is normally much greater than in
subsistence agriculture. (A small industrial sector is also associa-
ted with small size of country1 and it is significant that 17 of the
list of hard-core countries have populations of less than 5 million
and a further 3 have populations of less than 10 million.) But all
this tells us very little about structure in any helpful or practi-
cal sense. This was implicitly recognised by the recent expert
groups who emphasised the ned for country--by-country studies rather
than further generalisations about least-developed country struc-
tures as a whole.
(d) Lastly, we may be identifying, not so much countries, as pro-
bleuis. The classification may be intended to emphasise that there
are certain identifiable problems which, while applying in some de-
gree in many countries, present particular difficulties in some
countries. This approach would imply that the search for criteria
leading to an identification of a clearly defined list of countries
is pointless and that what we are really seeking is a series of
lists of countries seriously affected by specific problems. These
lists may well overlap and some countries may be found on several
such lists.
The definition of least-developed countries in terms of pro-
blems in fact corresponds closely to the policy discussions which
have taken place on special measures for their benefit. These have
normally been in the context of the interests of the organisations
in which these discussions have taken place - and in particular, the
various agencies of the United Nations. They have theretore been con-
cerned with problems of concern to these organisations - especially
with aid, trade and regional relations. These have in practice defi-
ned the area of discussion even though the process ot identification
has been carried out in a totally different context.
2S. Kuznets, Econor,ri-c Growth oj Nations, Harvard University Press,
1971, pp. 118-126.
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What then has the process of identification achieved so far? A
cynical answer night be that it has produced a list of countries
meeting certain arbitrary criteria laid down for least-developed
countries - except in so far as there are countries whose statistics
are so poor that it is not possible to say whether they meet the
criteria or not. In other words, we now have a more or less agreed
list of countries with an average income of less than $100, with
less than 20 per cent adult literacy and an industrial contribution
to GNP of less than 10 per cent. Since the list has been produced
in the context of special measures for assisting such countries, one
of its main effects has been to raise objections from very poor
countries not on the list to the effect that they should be on it,
as well as from countries with no prospects of being classified as
least-developed countries and which fear (not entirely unjustifia-
bly) that measures in favour of countries on the list will be at
their expense. Thus the process of identification has become a poli-
tical issue. But the whole concept of 'least-developed country'
cannot in any event be divorced from politics. Since the classif j-
cation has emerged in international institutions and groups dealing
with or representative of nation states, it has taken the nation
state as its unit of consideration. But many similar considerations
apply to the backward areas in larger countries as to least-devel-
oped states as such. Thus before Zambia became independent there was
some pressure from the traditional rulers in Barotseland for the es-
tablishment of a separate Barotse state. If it had been established,
it would certainly have been on the list of least-developed coun-
tries. Since it has not, Barotseland has become an internal Zambian
problem. But the nature and problems of the Barotse economy are not
substantially different from what they would have been if Barotse
land had been a separate state. Thus the whole identification exer-
cise has taken place within a politically defined framework and this
framework has dictated the area of concern.
The use of the nation state as the unit of consideration has
another implication. Most nation states in the third world are
small. Some 45 per cent of the member countries of the U.N. in 1971
had populations of less than 5 million and a further 15 per cent had
populations between 5 and 10 million. It has already been pointed
out that 17 of the list of 25 least-developed countries have popula-
tions of less than 5 million and a further 3 have populations of
less than 10 million. Clearly this emphasis on small countries in
the identification of least-developed countries is very largely a
retlection ot the political framework in which the process of iden-
tification has taken place (although, as has been pointed out, it
also reflects the use of industrial development as one of the crite-
ria employed). If, instead of countries, the unit had been, say,
people, a very different picture would have emerged. Thus (taking an
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explicit welfare criterion, if we were to try to identify actual
numbers ot people falling below certain minimum standards, obviously
most of these would be found in large countries such as India.
3. An alternative approach
But in spite of these limitations, the work on the least-deve-
loped countries has brought up a number of serious and important
problems, which can be most conveniently considered in the context
of the discussions at Santiago. These, as I have said, relate to the
principal interests of UNCTAD - that is, to aid, trade and regional
institutions.
On aid, one central problem which has been identified is that
there are certaín countries with a low absorptive capacity for new
investment, either because of administrative limitations or because
the type ot investment needed, e.g. in social or physical mf ras-
tructure, has a very low rate of return. Indeed, in the short run,
some investments have a negative rate of return, i.e. the cost of
maintaining or running the new services may be greater than their
short-term benetit. Whether or not such investirent ís worthwhile
must depend on our time-scale - that is, what rate of discount is
applied to long-term benetits. Here it is argued that the use of
conventional rates of discount will rule out most projects, so that
there is a need for a different set of evaluation criteria from
thoae used in other countries.
To some extent the resolutions adopted at UNCTAD III show an
appreciation of this problem. They point to the need tor, "ensuring
that... assistance is not guided solely by financial criteria but
that consideration is given to the long-term social rate of return,
including secondary effects, from development projects." and again,
". . .to ensure that financial and technical assistance takes into
account the long-terni nature of the least-developed countries'
development problem." This could be read as implying the adoption of
a different set ot criteria, and in particular a different set of
discount rates, tor the evaluation of projects from least-developed
countries. It is not clear whether this is the intention. Such diff-
erential treatment is indeed already implied in the distinction
between IDA countries and other countries, but IDA countries are of
course a much wider group than the least-developed countries.
The difficulty in the resolution is the identification
process with which it is allied. Is it reasonable to suppose that
there is a group of 25 countries where projects should be evaluated
on a different basis from that used in all other poor countries?
If, however, we take the problem approach to the least-developed
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countries, the difficulty disappears. We can reasonably argue that
there are countries where development is going to be a very long-
term process and that any system of evaluation which ignores long-
term benefits because of the use of high discount rates will have
the effect of ruling out virtually any development effort. The con-
clusion might be that bilateral and multilateral aid agencies should
be ready to adopt a flexible approach to the choice ot criteria and
should adapt them to the specific circumstances and needs of the
country concerned.
This, although an advance, still leaves many gaps. For example,
if development is to be a long-term process, any development strate-
gy must be long-term too and there must be some degree of assurance
that resources will be available over a substantial period to meet
development objectives. But donors generally do not like to enter
into long-term commitments. There is clearly a whole area of policy
to be explored: how to make resources available on a long-term and
assured basis to countries of this kind, whether through some adap-
tation of the SDR system or through the creation of a special fund
(a proposal which received little support from the rich countries at
Santiago).
A study of these needs and of the desirability and feasibility
of setting up a special fund is to be made following UNCTAD III.
There is another aspect of aid policy which the resolution does not
mention: the need for budgetary aid under whatever name. If the
short-term effect of investment is to create budgetary difficulties,
the budget itself becomes a major constraint on development plann-
ing. I have argued elsewhere against the artificial - and indeed
quasi-theological - distinction which aid donors make between 'deve-
lopment' aid and budgetary aid1. Although the point is made in the
UNCTAD Secretariat proposals before the conference, it is not clear-
ly reflected in the resolution itself. Budgetary aid notoriously
creates political and administrative problems for both donor and
recipient countries, but these problems need to be met and not
ignored.
On the trade side, the main problem which has been identified
is that there are certain countries which have benefited and seem
likely to benefit to only a very small extent from the concessions
which the rich countries have made in earlier sessions of UNCTAD -
in particular from the generalised system of preferences. Since this
1P.Selwyn, "Should the poorest Countries get More Aid?"
Internationat Development Review, September 1969.
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arrangement is restricted to manufactures, it is clearly of little
benefit to countries with very small industrial sectors and even
smaller industrial exports. Here UNCTAD III marks some distinct pro-
gress. If the resolutions are implemented (which, if we may judge
from experience, is by no means certain) the system should eventual-
ly be extended to cover processed and semi-manufactured products,
and its period of operation should be extended to allow some of the
countries which do not at present benefit from it to do so. The re-
solution also states that escape clause measures introduced by pre-
ference-giving countries should remain exceptional and should be
decided on only after due account has been taken (as far as their
legal provisions permit) of the interest of the least-developed
countries.
Again, apart from the vagueness and the lack of teeth in such a
resolution, the interests of the least-developed countries in this
field are not substantially different from those of many other poor
countries with a low level of manufactured exports. Indeed, any re-
laxation of escape clause measures specifically in favour ot least-
developed countries would discriminate against other poor countries.
The resolution does not suggest such discrimination, and it is high
ly unlikely that any resolution along such lines would have been
accepted. The only reasonable interpretation of the resolution is
that escape clause procedures should be exceptional in respect of
products of interest to least developed countries, i.e. processed
products and semi-manutactures. Again, what appears on the surface
to be a measure specially related to the problems of least-developed
countries should on this interpretation be of interest to a far
wider group of countries. What is of major concern is how this is
interpreted by the main importing countries or trading areas. The
short-term prospects are hardly favourable. Those least-developed
countries which at present benefit from Commonwealth Preferences
(Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda) will shortly come
under the more restrictive EEC rules of access for processed prod-
ucts and semi-manufactures. Possibly the first test of the meaning
of the resolution will occur when it is seen what terms these coun-
tries (and others similarly situated) obtain trom the European Comm-
unity.
Lastly, there is the matter of the regional problems of the
least-developed countries. A cursory examination of the list of 25
'hard-core' countries suggests that most of them are peripheral
areas in the regions in which they are situated, and that they suf-
fer from the polarisation processes common to nuclear regions. Thus
the regional dimension of their problems may be of central importan-
ce and, in so far as regional issues are of concern to UNCTAD, this
is also reflected in the resolutions. The difficulty in this policy
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area is that, whereas in the fields of aid and world trade the deve-
loping countries at UNCTAD were seeking concessions from the develo-
ped countries, in this field concessions are being sought mainly
(though not entirely) from other developing countries. Thus the re-
solutions on regional groupings suggest Tiaspects (which) should be
studied with a view to facilitating the association ot the least-
developed countries." These include permission to impose quantitative
restrictions, temporary exemption from alignment ot tariffs, the
granting of greater fiscal incentives for new investment, preferen-
tial allocation of regional financial resources, first choice in the
location of industries and the extension of regional commodity agree-
ments. All these measures involve some sacrífice by the more advanced
countries in the region. It is possible that such concessions may be
offered on purely commercial considerations - that is, that the gains
obtained by the more advanced countries in regional associations may
be sufficient for it to be worth their while to make concessions to
their weaker partners. But the resolution clearly implies more than
this. It suggests a deliberate policy of operating regional associa-
tions in such a way as to be of special assistance to the least-
developed countries - in other words, that action in favour of some
poor countries should be at the expense of other poor countries. Is
such a policy practicable unless it is in some way supported by con-
cessions or assistance from the developed countries? The only refe-
rence the Santiago resolutions make to the possibility of such help
is in relation to regional development banks, which are to be encou-
raged to widen their participation in the financing of small-scale
projects in the least-developed countries or of regional multina-
tional projects involving such countries. This is presumably to be
associated with an increase in the resources to be made available to
such banks. It may be doubted whether this is adequate for a really
effective policy of shaping the regional institutions in such a way
as to be of assistance to their least-developed members.
Here too, the problem is not confined to the so-called least-
developed countries. In regional associations such as LAFTA, CACM,
and CARIFTA, the polarisation of development is a key issue, even
though none of their members are on the list of 25 hard-core least-
developed countries. Special arrangements have been found necessary
for dealing with the problem in all these areas.
4. Conclusions
To sum up, discussing the issue in terms of a list of identifi-
able countries tends to be unhelpful; indeed one expert group sugg-
ested a special classification of 'comparatively disadvantaged'
countries in regional terms in order to meet this difficulty1. But
1Report of the ad Iwo Group of Experts on special measures in favour
of the least-developed among the developing countries, UNCTAD
TD/B/349, 19 May 1971.
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a classification of 'least development' in terms of problems rather
than countries would surely be more helpful in this context. By so
doing, we would be identifying the issue whether it arose in Lesotho
(which is on the list) or in Dominica or Paraguay (which are not).
I would argue, then, that the process of seeking for special
measures in favour of the least-developed countries has been confu-
sed and hindered by the identification process with which it has
been associated. There is a range of problem areas, to which we may
usefully apply the term 'least development' and where sensible int-
ernational action could make a useful impact. But the attempt tc
associate an approach to these problems with a limited and specified
group of countries both hinders their solution in political terms
and directs attention away from the real issues involved.
It is true that the problem approach itself involves ditficul-
ties, for problems cannot be considered in isolation. Obviously the
situation of a country with a high level of illiteracy and very low
average incomes is different from one where a high illiteracy rate
is associated with higher incomes but also with substantial social
and economic inequalities - that is, where resources are available
locally tor improving educational standards, but where decision-
makers are not concerned with providing education for the people.
Any international agency concerned with this problem should obvious-
ly take all the circumstances into account in arriving at a policy.
But this procedure, although complicated and sometimes difficult,
raises fewer problems than does the attempt to take action on the
basis of a discreet and limited number of countries. What is needed
is a degree of flexibility and a willingness to study the problems
and the contexts in which they arise, rather than an attempt to pre-
judge the issue by means of an arbitrary exercise in identification.
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